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(1997 $ per capita)
Total revenue 2.08 0.21
Total expenditure 52.04 6.92
Cash assistance spending 8.55 9.77
All public welfare spending 29.76 10.22
Federal intergovernment
   grants for public welfare
   received by state 13.68 5.88
Income tax revenue –10.30 2.71
Notes: These results come from ordinary least squares regres-
sions. Each row represents a separate regression. The right-
hand side variables included in these regressions are the
average unemployment rate in the state during the state’s
fiscal year, a series of state dummy variables, a linear time
trend, and a constant. The absolute value of the t-statistics
reported above demonstrates that all of these relationships
are significant at the 1% level, with the exception of the first one
which is insignificant at all conventional levels.
Source: Author’s tabulations using state finance data from
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1998,
State Government Finances, available on the Internet at
www.census.gov/govs/www/index.html and unemployment
rate data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1998, “Local area unemployment,” available on the
Internet at www.bls.gov/top20.html.
1. State budget items and the business cycle, 1988–96
Welfare reform and
state budgets
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton
signed the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.
Among the major changes contained
in the act were limits in eligibility for
the Supplemental Security Income
and Food Stamp programs and an end
to the entitlement of families with chil-
dren to cash assistance. The act replaced
the cash assistance program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), with Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF). The AFDC
program had been an open-ended
matching grant program, where federal
grants grew in line with state expendi-
ture. By contrast, the TANF program is
a fixed block grant. While a block grant
gives states greater flexibility, more
financial independence, and the abili-
ty to innovate, it also renders the feder-
al grant amount to a state independent
of the state’s changing needs over the
business cycle. In this Chicago Fed Letter,
I compare the relationship between
federal and state welfare spending
and state budgets under the AFDC
program and under the first two years
of the TANF program.
State budgets under AFDC
Under AFDC, all eligible families in a
state received a monthly benefit that was
set by the state. The federal government
paid for half of the program’s adminis-
trative costs and a portion of the state’s
benefit payments, which was tied to the
states’s per capita income.
Under the matching grant system, the
money coming from the federal gov-
ernment increased during times of
economic hardship in the state. If the
state economy worsened and case-
loads swelled, the state and federal
governments shared the increased
costs. Therefore, federal grants were
countercyclical in nature. Figure 1
illustrates the relationship between
state government budgets, public wel-
fare spending, federal intergovernment
welfare transfers, and the business cycle
from 1988 through 1996.
The figure demonstrates the impor-
tance of federal government public
welfare grants in mitigating the effects
of the business cycle on state budgets.
The first row of the figure shows that
total state revenue is practically inde-
pendent of the business cycle. By con-
trast, the second row demonstrates that
state expenditure is very responsive to
the business cycle—a 1 percentage
point increase in the state’s fiscal year
unemployment rate (e.g., a jump from
6% to 7%) increased state per capita
expenditure by $52.
The data presented in
the third and fourth rows
of figure 1 show that ap-
proximately 15% of this
increase was driven by in-
creases in cash assistance
spending ($8.55 of
$52.04), while more than
half of the increase was
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ments for medical care
and other purposes, and
spending for other wel-
fare programs. From
these two rows it is clear
that during times of high
unemployment, states
expended more resourc-
es assisting the needy.
Figure 1 also shows that
between 1988 and 1996
at the same time that
state government public welfare
spending increased, public welfare
grants from the federal government in-
creased. Row five shows that about half
the increase in public welfare spend-
ing was financed by grants from the
federal government.
The final row of figure 1 depicts the
decline in state income tax revenues
that occurs when the state economy
worsens. A comparison between the
coefficients in rows five and six reveals
that the growth in federal government
welfare grants approximately compen-
sated for the decline in income tax
revenues brought about by a declining
economy.2. Federal welfare grants to Seventh District states
Programs TANF
replaced by block grant Percent
TANF, 1996 1997–2002 change
(millions of nominal dollars)
Illinois 593 585 –1
Indiana 121 207 70
Iowa 124 132 6
Michigan 581 775 33
Wisconsin 240 318 33
Seventh District 1,660 2,017 22
U.S. 14,992 16,396 9
Source: Data from U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998,
Welfare Reform: Early Fiscal Effects of the TANF Block Grant,
letter report, No. GAO/AIMD-98-137, August 18.
The switch to TANF
The provisions of the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act give states a fixed nominal
block grant to spend on the programs
replaced with TANF for each fiscal year
from 1997 through 2002. In addition to
replacing AFDC, the TANF block grant
is also to be used to fund programs pre-
viously supported by the much smaller
Job Opportunity and Basic Skills and
Emergency Assistance funds. The
amount of the block grant is the maxi-
mum of the federal contribution to these
programs in federal fiscal year 1994, in
federal fiscal year 1995, or the average of
the federal contribution between feder-
al fiscal years 1992 and 1994.
The total amount of the block grants
for 1997–2002 is $16.4 billion per year,
which represents a 9% increase over
total federal TANF-related program
spending in 1996.1 Figure 2 shows that
the original federal endowments were
generous in general and very generous
for the Seventh District states overall.
In addition to federal funds, the law
contains a maintenance of effort (MOE)
provision that requires states to contin-
ue to spend 75% of the money they had
spent in fiscal year 1994 out of their own
budgets on the programs replaced by
TANF. While the federal block grant
money must be spent on families that
meet certain work requirements and
time limits, states have a great deal of
freedom as to how they spend their
MOE funds.
In recognition of the fact that states
usually need more resources in diffi-
cult economic times, the law provides
two additional sources of funds in the
event of a recession—a $2 billion con-
tingency fund and a $1.7 billion rainy
day loan fund. The contingency fund
allows a state to receive a maximum of
20% of its yearly block grant in any year
in which it has a sufficiently high un-
employment rate or sufficiently high
growth in its food stamp population.
The loan fund allows a state to borrow
up to 10% of its grant for up to three
years. In addition, although states are
required to spend their MOE funds in
a given fiscal year, they do not need to
spend their entire block grant. States
are permitted to leave some of the
block grant for future use on account at
the U.S. Treasury.
The states had until July
1, 1997, to put into effect
a plan to achieve the
goals of the TANF pro-
gram. However, states
could switch to TANF
earlier if their plan for
using the funds was ac-
cepted. Because of the
healthy state of the econ-
omy following the law’s
passage, the matching
grant levels were lower
than the block grant lev-
els and states had an in-
centive to switch to TANF
as early as possible.
The first years of TANF
In the two plus years since the enact-
ment of the TANF program, the new law
has been a windfall to state government
budgets. The strength of the economy
contributed to a 35% decline in recipi-
ent families between January 1996 and
June 1998.2 Under AFDC, the decline
in caseloads would have led to a drop
in the grants coming from the federal
government. Under TANF, the grants
remained at their legislated levels. In
addition, the low inflation rate during
this period meant that the real value of
the fixed nominal grant was only mini-
mally eroded.
The decline in caseloads combined
with the increase in federal government
spending has meant that states have
been able to spend more money on
each recipient. The Government Ac-
counting Office (GAO) estimated the
difference between the minimum level
of funds available under TANF (the sum
of MOE and the block grants) and the
amount that the states and federal gov-
ernment would have spent on their 1997
caseloads if they were still operating un-
der the AFDC cost structure. It found
that states had an additional $4.7 billion
to spend under TANF than they would
have had under AFDC.3
States have used these additional funds
in a variety of ways. In general, states
have increased their spending on sup-
port services. State and federal child
care expenditures for 1998 are expect-
ed to be 69% higher than in 1996, and
expenditures on job training and
placement programs are estimated to
be 58% higher in 1998 than they were
in 1996.4 In addition, some states have
not spent these additional resources,
but have left them on account at the
Treasury. According to the GAO, as of
September 30, 1997, states had $1.2
billion in unspent balances remaining
at the U.S. Treasury. The GAO points
out that it is unclear whether these un-
spent funds were the result of deliber-
ate contingency planning by the states
or an outgrowth of the transitional
nature of TANF during its first year.
Importantly, states are limited in their
ability to develop their own dedicated
welfare reserve funds, because money
deposited in a reserve fund does not
count toward the state MOE require-
ment in the year it was deposited.
TANF during a recession
While welfare reform has been a wind-
fall for the states in this period of eco-
nomic expansion, the opposite would
be true during a time of economic de-
cline. Were unemployment rates to
increase, caseloads would likely grow
and demands on state budgets would
likewise increase. At the same time, the
TANF block grant would remain at its
specified nominal level.
How states will deal with these increased
demands is an open question. Because
most states operate under balanced
budget requirements and debt limits,
they will for the most part be unable to
finance heightened welfare spending
by borrowing against future resources.
States will essentially face five choices.
They could increase or maintain their
total welfare spending by decreasing
spending in other areas or by increasing
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Note: Year-end balances are estimates
and include both the ending balance and
balances in budget stabilization funds.
Source: National Association of State
Budget Officers, 1998, Fiscal Survey of
the States, May, available on the Internet
at www.nasbo.org/pubs/fiscsurv/
fs0598/frame.htm.
3. 1998 year-end balances
1U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, Wel-
fare Reform: Early Fiscal Effects of the TANF Block
Grant, letter report, No. GAO/AIMD-98-137,
August 18.
2U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, The Administration for Children and
Families, “Changes in welfare caseloads as of
June 1998,” available at www.acf.dhhs.gov.
3U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, op. cit.
4Data from National Association of State Budget
Officers, 1998, Special Feature: Welfare Reform,
available on the Internet at www.nasbo. org/
pubs/fiscsurv/fs0598/frame.htm. The per-
cent changes are in nominal dollars because
the 1998 GDP deflator is not yet available. The
childcare number omits six states and the work
program number omits five states due to un-
availability of data.
5U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, op. cit.
spending by cutting programs and
benefit levels or by restricting eligibili-
ty. They could spend money saved in
rainy day funds or money maintained
at the Treasury. They could access loan
or contingency funds. Finally, they
could lobby Congress to change the
law and increase the level of spending.
At the beginning of a downturn, states
may well be able to fund increased wel-
fare spending using money saved in
rainy day funds or at the Treasury or by
decreasing spending in other areas. In
the late 1990s nearly all states have
shown impressive budget surpluses.
States have both returned money to
their citizens and beefed up balances.
Figure 3 depicts year-end balances as
a percent of spending in fiscal 1998 in
the U.S. as a whole and in the Seventh
District. The magnitude of these bal-
ances suggests that states may be able
to maintain service levels for a while
following an increase in their welfare
rolls by drawing down balances.
However, if a downturn proves lengthy,
these balances may dry up. In that case,
one option would be for states to main-
tain benefit levels by increasing taxes.
However, given the contentious nature
of legislation for tax increases, it is un-
likely that they would be enacted in a
timely manner. It is also unlikely that
states would use the contingency or
rainy day loan fund provisions in the
TANF legislation. Use of the contingen-
cy fund requires states to spend 100%
of their fiscal 1994 expenditures for a
limited set of purposes. This require-
ment, combined with the need to meet
the unemployment or food stamp trig-
gers, renders the contingency fund a
complex source of funds. Even if states
do choose to access the contingency
funds, the funds are not large enough
to help many states for more than a short
period. The rainy day loan fund is not
very attractive to states either. State offi-
cials reported to the GAO that borrow-
ing for increased welfare spending is
unlikely to be politically popular dur-
ing a recession.5
This leaves states with two choices.
They can cut benefits or they can turn
to the federal government for help. Af-
ter drawing down balances, states will
probably need to cut welfare spending.
This is unfortunate because it would
result in an interruption of services at
the time when such services were most
needed. Moreover, in order to receive
their full government grant, states
need a portion of their caseload to
meet certain work requirements. Dur-
ing a period of high unemployment,
finding or creating work for recipients
will be both difficult and costly. With
more money going toward work require-
ments, benefits levels would need to
shrink. A decline in benefit levels
would most likely lead both state officials
and advocacy groups to pressure the
federal government to appropriate
more funds for the program.
Over time, other reasons to change
the law will probably surface. For exam-
ple, fixed nominal block grants based
on mid-1990s spending levels will ul-
timately become outdated. Ideally,
changes in the law would explicitly
take into account the relationship be-
tween public welfare demands and
the condition of the labor market by
making the level of block grants and
the nature of work requirements de-
pendent on the state economy.
Conclusion
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I have ex-
plored the relationship between the
business cycle and state and federal
public welfare spending before and
after welfare reform. While prior to
welfare reform, federal government
transfers were countercyclical, the
passage of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act made federal cash assistance
grants independent of the business
cycle. This change has been a wind-
fall for state budgets in the period im-
mediately following welfare reform
because of the health of the economy.
However, state budgets would be sub-
ject to increased fiscal pressures in the
event of a downturn. While the size of
recent budget surpluses suggests that
most states would be able to cope with a
brief downturn, a prolonged recession
could lead to disruptions in state wel-
fare programs and, ultimately, to changes





















































































































































































































































Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufactur-
ing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours. IP represents the Federal Re-
serve Board’s Industrial Production Index for
the U.S. manufacturing sector. Autos and light
trucks are measured in annualized units, using
seasonal adjustments developed by the Board.
The purchasing managers’ survey data for the
Midwest are weighted averages of the seasonal-
ly adjusted production components from the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing
Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
Manufacturing output  indexes, 1992=100
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Oct. Month  ago Year ago
MW 57.3 67.8 62.6
U.S. 52.6 53.4 59.6
Motor vehicle production
(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Oct. Month  ago Year ago
Cars 6.1 6.5 5.9





Sep. Month  ago Year ago
CFMMI 124.8 125.9 122.1
IP 131.3 131.9 128.0
The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) decreased 0.9% in
September following a revised 3.3% gain in August. The Federal Reserve Board’s
Industrial Production Index for manufacturing (IP) fell 0.4% in September
following an increase of 1.8% in August. Car production decreased to 6.1 million
units from 6.5 million units. Light truck production increased to 6.6 million
units in October from 5.9 million units in September.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index (a weighted average of the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee surveys) for production decreased to 57.3% in
October from 67.8% in September. Purchasing managers’ indexes decreased in
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee. The national purchasing managers’ survey for
production declined from 53.4% to 52.6% from September to October.





Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity